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Abstract
To support the mission of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office of
the Department of Homeland Security, the Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation group
is researching active interrogation techniques and the development of new detection
algorithms for fast neutron spectroscopy. The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Office has loaned us a Varian M9 linear accelerator (linac), helium-3 detectors, boroncoated straw detectors, and perfluorocarbon detectors as part of this research, providing
a variety of tools to conduct our experiments. In the summer of 2018, a thorough licensing
process concluded, and preliminary experiments commenced. Later in the year, the
facility was approved to possess and irradiate depleted uranium, which enabled us to
conduct active interrogation experiments. In the fall of 2018, we conducted our first active
interrogation measurements using the linac facility. The measurements used the linac to
irradiate depleted uranium, lead, and tungsten targets to induce photonuclear reactions
to emit fast neutrons. The neutrons were then detected using a simple helium-3 detector.
Simulations were developed using MCNPX-PoliMi and MCNP 6.1 to validate the
measured results. The simulations showed close agreement for depleted uranium but
indicated that additional investigation is required for the lead and tungsten data. The
facility will be indispensable as the research progresses by providing a mixed-radiation
field consisting of fast neutrons and photons, which is similar to the radiation environment
encountered in active interrogation scenarios. Additionally, the facility is involved in
research related to radiation damage, dosimetry, and radiation-oncology. Future activities
will involve characterization of photonuclear properties of various materials, and
collaborations with other university researchers.

Introduction
Radiation portal monitors have been deployed at ports of entry to the United States
[1] to detect illicit radioactive sources such as radiological dispersal devices or nuclear
weapons. High-activity radioactive sources can be detected with relative ease by portal
monitors, however, uranium-based nuclear weapons are more difficult to detect by portals
due to highly enriched uranium’s low rate of neutron emission and primarily low-energy
photon emission. Photon active interrogation can improve the ability of inspections
systems to detect uranium by inducing photoneutron emissions or photofissions in the
fissile material. The detection of these characteristic neutrons would then be used to
identify the presence of illicit uranium.
Neutron detection techniques have traditionally relied upon helium-3 capture
detectors, however, recent concerns of helium-3 shortages and the desire to improve time
resolution of detection systems have motivated the development of organic-scintillatorbased systems that use pulse shape discrimination (PSD) to replace helium-3-based
systems. When using PSD-capable organic scintillators, detector pulses exhibit different
decay rates depending on what radiation caused the scintillation. The ratio of the
integrated charge in the pulse tail to the pulse total is relatively larger in scintillation pulses
caused by neutrons, and this ratio can be used to identify the particle type [2]. Though
the detector is sensitive to both neutrons and photons, the photon active interrogation
system will produce a high photon environment that can result in pulse pile-up of detector
signals. This results in difficulty identifying neutrons. Because this obstacle requires
expertise in both nuclear engineering as well as electrical engineering and computer
science, our project team includes a research team from the Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science (EECS) department at the University of Michigan. This research is
working to develop a neural-network-based algorithm that can separate piled-up pulses
such that PSD can be used to recover detected neutron pulses.
Previous work by our research group optimized shielding configurations for a
stilbene detector and a representative irradiation target [3], however, this study only
focused on target effects to optimize detector shielding. Licensing was not completed at
that time, so measurements could not be taken and included in that study. To build upon
this research, we conduct neutron measurements of lead, tungsten, and depleted

uranium using the linac and a helium-3 detector. Because helium-3 has a high gammarejection rate, it will provide high-confidence neutron measurements to establish
benchmarks for future active interrogation experiments. Results will be used to validate
simulations of the linac laboratory at the University of Michigan and support our goal to
develop a neural-network-based algorithm to recover neutron pulses from pile-up events.
Methods
Experimental Setup and Procedure
The lab experiment was conducted in the DNNG linac facility, using the Varian 1kW, 9-MeV linear accelerator [4]. The linac produces a bremsstrahlung spectrum with a
9 MeV endpoint, which exceeds the photonuclear thresholds of materials such as lead,
tungsten, and depleted uranium [5]. A birds-eye view of the lab is shown in Fig. 1 below.
The linac vault is constructed with concrete blocks and has a lead collimator. At the end
of the beamline is a beamstop made of lead and borated polyethylene. The beamline is
blocked off with a fence, and safety interlocks are used to ensure safe operation.

Fig. 1 Overhead view of the DNNG Linac Facility [6]. Lab Dimensions are 20m x 15.7m

To evaluate the performance of the neural-network-based algorithm, we need to
collect data to use as the benchmark, or ground truth radiation rates. Helium-3 detectors
are ideal for benchmarking experiments because their gamma rejection capability will
result in high-accuracy neutron measurements. Thus, a simple helium-3 detector was
placed approximately 1 meter from the target to avoid direct irradiation. The irradiation
targets used for the experiment were lead, tungsten, and depleted uranium because
these materials have photonuclear thresholds below the 9-MeV endpoint energy of the
linac. Because these materials have different photonuclear thresholds, the emitted

neutrons will have different energy spectra, which is valuable for benchmarking because
we can validate algorithm performance with a wider range of neutron energies and
different energy spectra. The target sizes were chosen based on preliminary
measurements and simulations. Future iterations may make use of larger targets to
increase the detected neutron rate.
Model Development
Though a full-lab model was developed and used to license the facility [6], it is
computationally expensive, and we typically make simplified models when possible.
Additionally, simulating the electron source in the linac is computationally expensive due
to the resources required to simulate coulombic interactions the electrons undergo. To
remedy these issues, a simplified modeling approach had to be taken. First, we simulated
the electron source and tallied the bremsstrahlung energy spectrum. We then use the
results of the tally to model a full coverage photon beam incident on the target. Second,
we modeled only a small portion of the lab space. A model developed for this experiment
is shown in Fig. 2 below. All materials cards were constructed using a Pacific Northwest
National Lab material composition report [7]. In the future, full-lab simulations will be
needed because simplified models will not fully replicate room return effects.

Fig. 2: Simplified MCNP Experimental Model. The floor and ceiling are modeled as concrete, with
soil modeled below the floor. The polyethylene of the detector is shown in green, with the helium3 tubes inside. A lead irradiation target is shown in blue and sits on a wood block that was used to
align the target with the collimator beam port.

Results
For each configuration, an active background measurement was taken, then the
target was added and interrogated. Due to the high cross section of the 3He(n,p)3H
reaction and the intensity of the linac photon beam, measurements were quite short; on
the order of five minutes for each configuration. A comparison of the active background
and interrogation measurement results is included in Table 1 below. The data shows that
statistically significant increases in neutron counts were measured when targets were
added. For comparison, passive background was measured to be 14.05 ± 0.3 counts per
second (CPS). Uncertainties in the measured data were assumed to obey Poisson
statistics. Note that the active background varies for each target. Each measurement was
taken with wait times of approximately one minute between them, and the only
configuration change was the addition or removal of targets. Therefore, additional
investigation is required to determine the cause of the active background “drift.” It is
possible that there is some instability in the linac operation causing inconsistent photon
production. This should be investigated in the future and can be mitigated by taking longer
measurements, so the effects of linac pulse variations are minimized.
Table 1: Results of the active interrogation measurements. For comparison, passive
background was measured to be 14.05 ± 0.3 CPS.
Net Count Rate;
Active Background Gross Count Rate
Target
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒔 – 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑩𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅
(CPS)
(CPS)
(CPS)
lead (2098 cm3)
5012.7 ± 6.5
6314.2 ± 7.3
1301.5 ± 9.7
tungsten (524 cm3)
4791.5 ± 6.3
5608.0 ± 6.8
816.5 ± 9.0
depleted uranium (300 cm 3)
4905.4 ± 6.4
6657.1 ± 7.4
1741.7 ± 9.8

Experimental results were compared with MCNP simulations for verification and
included in Table 2 below. Uncertainty in the simulated detection rates were output as
part of the MCNP tallies. Table 2 shows good agreement between the DU simulation and
measurements; within 6%. In contrast, the lead and tungsten values differed by 49% and
73%, respectively from simulation to measurements. It is possible that the photonuclear
data for lead and tungsten are of lower fidelity than the uranium data. Uncertainties in the
region overlapping the interrogation bremsstrahlung spectrum and the photonuclear
cross sections may result in large mismatches. Additionally, the energy spectra of the
neutron emissions from lead and tungsten differs significantly from the depleted uranium
neutron emissions, because the photonuclear thresholds differ significantly, and lead and

tungsten do not undergo photofission. If materials within the lab space affect room-return
of lower energy neutrons disproportionately more than the higher energy neutrons emitted
by the depleted uranium, omissions of room geometry from the model may affect the
accuracy of the simulations differently for different targets. Therefore, simulations with the
full laboratory should be made to conclusively rule out room return or other room geometry
effects.
Table 2: Comparison of simulated and measured results. Volumes are approximate.
Net Detection Rate (CPS)
Deviation from Measured
Target
(%)
Simulated
Measured
lead (2098 cm3)
658.6 ± 4.6
1301.5 ± 9.7
−49%
tungsten (524 cm3)
221.4 ± 6.8
816.5 ± 9.0
−73%
depleted uranium (300 cm3)
1855.3 ± 4.6
1741.7 ± 9.8
+6%

Conclusions
The initial active interrogation experiments at the University of Michigan linac
facility were conducted in the fall of 2018. Lead, tungsten, and DU targets were irradiated
by the linac, and the induced neutron emissions were measured with a helium-3 detector.
The measurements show that the linac can produce sufficient neutron emissions in
available materials. Therefore, the facility can be used to develop new algorithms for fast
neutron spectroscopy using organic scintillators and neural-network-based algorithms.
Additionally, the simulation validation results show that we can replicate depleted uranium
measurements in simulations. Future simulations will be valuable for benchmarking and
validation of the algorithms developed during this research. Because the lead and
tungsten measurements did not closely match the simulations, additional investigation
must be done before using these materials in benchmarking experiments and simulations.
In the future, the linac facility will continue to be used for active interrogation
projects in addition to this project. As the neural-network based algorithm progresses,
training data and test data will need to be collected. Such data will need to cover a wide
range of count rates, ratios of photons to neutrons, and energy spectra. Collaborations
will continue with the University of Michigan Radiation Oncology department to study
dosimetry and dose localization techniques. Further collaborations with groups from other
Universities, or national laboratories will be pursued.
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